G protein‐coupled receptors (GPCRs) constitute the largest family of transmembrane proteins and play a crucial role in regulating diverse cellular functions. They transmit their signaling via binding to intracellular signal transducers and effectors, such as G proteins, GPCR kinases, and β‐arrestins. To influence specific GPCR signaling behaviors, β‐arrestins recruit effectors to form larger signaling complexes. Intriguingly, they facilitate divergent functions for the binding to different receptors. Recent studies relying on advanced structural approaches, novel biosensors and interactome analyses bring us closer (...) to understanding how this specificity is achieved. In this article, we share our hypothesis of how active GPCRs induce specific conformational rearrangements within β‐arrestins to reveal distinct binding interfaces, enabling the recruitment of a subset of effectors to foster specialized signaling complexes. Furthermore, we discuss methods of how to comprehensively assess β‐arrestin conformational states and present the current state of research regarding the functionality of these multifaceted scaffolding proteins. (shrink)

Deliberative democracy grounds its legitimacy largely in the ability of speakers to participate on equal terms. Yet theorists and practitioners have struggled with how to establish deliberative equality in the face of stark differences of power in liberal democracies. Designers of innovative civic forums for deliberation often aim to neutralize inequities among participants through proportional inclusion of disempowered speakers and discourses. In contrast, others argue that democratic equality is best achieved when disempowered groups deliberate in their own enclaves before entering (...) the broader public sphere. Borrowing from each perspective, the authors argue that there are strong reasons to incorporate enclave deliberation among the disempowered within civic forums. They support this claim by presenting case study evidence showing that participants in such forums can gain some of the same benefits of deliberation found in more heterogeneous groups, can consider a diversity of viewpoints rather than falling into groupthink and polarization, and can persuade external stakeholders of the legitimacy of the group’s deliberations. (shrink)

Les écrits de Kant sur les races humaines, émaillés de caractérisations et de jugements qui heurtent notre sensibilité contemporaine, sont accueillis par un silence gêné des commentateurs. Ceux-ci croient bon de s'abstenir d'analyser ces textes, et d'y voir a priori des opinions mal élaborées, victimes de l'air du temps. Mais en évitant de se confronter à ce tabou, ils jouent aussi un mauvais tour à Kant. Car le lecteur peut avoir l'impression qu'on lui cache quelque chose. Qui plus est, les (...) textes sur les races font preuve d'une cohérence interne et d'une compacité théorique remarquables, et leur puissance explicative est inégalée dans le champ de l'anthropologie physique de son époque - celle de Buffon, de Blumenbach ou de Meiners. Est-ce à dire, comme le craignent d'avance les commentateurs, qu'on trouve chez Kant un authentique racisme théorique? En fait, cette accusation de racisme n'a pas vraiment d'objet à une époque où les modalités d'une pensée non raciste, c'est-à-dire d'une anthropologie non naturaliste, étaient au mieux en cours de constitution. Ce constat nous mène à considérer que seule une analyse dépassionnée des thèses raciologiques de Kant, prises dans toute leur violence, peut rendre justice à la doctrine kantienne. Nous ne cherchons pas à produire une " disculpation théorique " de Kant. Mais inversement, cet ouvrage ne vise pas non plus à formuler des thèses scandaleuses ou à révéler un " Kant non universaliste ". Il entend simplement montrer la tension d'une pensée qui fait de l'histoire un processus de civilisation en principe universel, articulé autour d'un centre de gravité à la fois géographique et spirituel, l'Europe, peuplée d'hommes blancs. Cet ouvrage intéressera les étudiants et chercheurs en philosophie et en histoire des sciences, mais aussi les étudiants et chercheurs en anthropologie. (shrink)

Philosophy is one of the most intimidating and difficult of disciplines, as any of its students can attest. This book is an important entry in a distinctive new series from Routledge: The Great Philosophers . Breaking down obstacles to understanding the ideas of history's greatest thinkers, these brief, accessible, and affordable volumes offer essential introductions to the great philosophers of the Western tradition from Plato to Wittgenstein. In just 64 pages, each author, a specialist on his subject, places the philosopher (...) and his ideas into historical perspective. Each volume explains, in simple terms, the basic concepts, enriching the narrative through the effective use of biographical detail. And instead of attempting to explain the philosopher's entire intellectual history, which can be daunting, this series takes one central theme in each philosopher's work, using it to unfold the philosopher's thoughts. (shrink)

This chapter examines how the borderline cases pointed out by English naturalists and philosophers in the second half of the seventeenth-century call into doubt the common notion of life as a vegetative power. In the first part of this chapter, I focus on Nehemiah Grew’s notions of life and living beings by comparing his plant anatomy, in which he examines the cases of sponges and corals, with his physico-theology. In the second part, I confront Grew’s views on life to those (...) of John Ray and Ralph Cudworth. My aim is threefold. First, I want to show that there was then no agreement on what a “vital phenomenon” is. Second, I want to emphasize the fact that what we would classify today as physical phenomena, such as gravitation, were then regarded as living phenomena. Third, and accordingly, I would like to challenge the view that the English naturalists and philosophers who then developed a physico-theology simply used empirical vital phenomena in order to refute Descartes’ metaphysics. In my view, there were no such things as “empirical vital phenomena.” Indeed, the very identification and description of the phenomena considered as “vital” was a matter of interpretation, and those different authors did not share the same set of assumptions regarding what kinds of beings are alive. At the very least, they do not share the set of assumptions that define what we regard as “vital.”. (shrink)

D. D. Raphael examines the moral philosophy of Adam Smith (1723-90), best known for his famous work on economics, The Wealth of Nations, and shows that his thought still has much to offer philosophers today. Raphael gives particular attention to Smith's original theory of conscience, with its emphasis on the role of 'sympathy' (shared feelings).

This article concerns the notion of living bodies that Spinoza develops in the Ethics (published posthumously in 1677). While commentators have emphasized the relevance of Spinoza’s works for contemporary physiology, they have neglected to study Spinoza’s own views on this topic. My aim is to draw attention to the specific parti pris that underlies Spinoza’s passages on anatomy. To do so, I first compare Spinoza’s claims on human body with the conceptions developed in his immediate historical environment. Then, I propose (...) to draw a parallel between Lakatos’s notion of “negative heuristics” and the high level of generalization Spinoza demonstrates in his propositions on the human body. This parallel allows me to show how Spinoza’s critical remarks on our knowledge of human body have heuristic value. (shrink)

This article seeks to extend and refine Alastair MacIntyre’s moral theory of virtue ethics, by probing behind the Benedictine Rule—so fulsomely invoked at the end of After Virtue—to the ascetical theology of the noted, Eastern, ‘Cappadocian’ theologian of the fourth century: Gregory of Nyssa. I shall argue that Gregory’s vision of ascetical bodily practice complicates MacIntyre’s contemporary appropriation of virtue ethics. It does so by underscoring the diachronic, developmental character of personal ethical maturation—a theme which finds no expression in MacIntyre’s (...) otherwise sophisticated account of ‘narrative’. (shrink)

Cicero's philosophical works introduced Latin audiences to the ideas of the Stoics, Epicureans and other schools and figures of the post-Aristotelian period, thus influencing the transmission of those ideas through later history. While Cicero's value as documentary evidence for the Hellenistic schools is unquestioned, Cicero: The Philosophy of a Roman Sceptic explores his writings as works of philosophy that do more than simply synthesize the thought of others, but instead offer a unique viewpoint of their own. In this volume (...) class='Hi'>Raphael Woolf describes and evaluates Cicero's philosophical achievements, paying particular attention to his relation to those philosophers he draws upon in his works, his Romanizing of Greek philosophy, and his own sceptical and dialectical outlook. The volume aims, using the best tools of philosophical, philological and historical analysis, to do Cicero justice as a distinctive philosophical voice. Situating Cicero's work in its historical and political context, this volume provides a detailed analysis of the thought of one of the finest orators and writers of the Roman period. Written in an accessible and engaging style, Cicero: The Philosophy of a Roman Sceptic is a key resource for those interested in Cicero's role in shaping Classical philosophy. (shrink)

Le mouvement des indignés s’inscrit dans la continuité des luttes contre le néolibéralisme, qui se manifestent partout sur la planète depuis plus de trente ans. Fruit de la mondialisation de la résistance, il constitue une nouvelle composante dans la mouvance altermondialiste qui renouvelle son registre d’action. Dénonçant explicitement les oligarchies, il milite pour un renouvellement du politique et un approfondissement de la démocratie.

La lecture de Newton joue un rôle décisif dans l’élaboration par Hegel et par Schelling de leur « philosophie de la nature », et dans leur manière de définir le rapport de la philosophie aux sciences positives. Hegel et Schelling, à partir d’un constat initial commun (Newton aurait fait malgré lui de la métaphysique, bien qu’il ait voulu s’en garder) développent deux lectures tout à fait divergentes. Hegel estime que Newton aurait dû s’en tenir au refus de la métaphysique. Schelling (...) au contraire regrette que Newton n’ait pas davantage pris conscience du nécessaire enracinement des concepts scientifiques dans des catégories métaphysiques. Nous tentons de montrer que cette divergence s’enracine dans un débat, lancé par Newton lui-même, sur le caractère réel ou conventionnel des forces décrites par la physique moderne. Cette analyse conduit à souligner un paradoxe : alors que Hegel développe une épistémologie très favorable au travail des sciences positives, il prend une position radicalement hostile aux conséquences philosophiques de la révolution galiléenne et newtonienne, Schelling quant à lui, développe à la fois une épistémologie méfiante vis-à-vis de l’indépendance des sciences positives, et une vision très moderne de la structure de l’univers, du statut des forces et de la définition de la matière. La place du temps naturel dans les systèmes de Hegel et de Schelling pourra ainsi être clarifiée. (shrink)

Un certain nombre de passages que Foucault consacre à Hegel (directement ou indirectement, via la figure de Jean Hyppolite) s’éclairent lorsqu’on les considère à la lumière du questionnement suivant : dans quelle mesure un individu contribue-t‑il à déterminer le sens du discours qu’il tient? Nous tentons de montrer que cette difficulté conduit Foucault à suggérer que l’influence de Hegel sur la philosophie postérieure a été ambivalente, à décrire le sens de la modernité comme l’effacement de la figure individuelle du penseur, (...) et à reconsidérer son propre parcours (nuançant en particulier la perspective de L’Archéologie du savoir ). Cette réflexion sur la place de la subjectivité dans le discours mène enfin Foucault à réassumer, dans ses derniers textes, le rôle du philosophe. (shrink)

The claim that consciousness constitutively involves self-consciousness has a long philosophical history, and has received renewed support in recent years. My aim in this paper is to argue that this surprisingly enduring idea is misleading at best, and insufficiently supported at worst. I start by offering an elucidatory account of consciousness, and outlining a number of foundational claims that plausibly follow from it. I subsequently distinguish two notions of self-consciousness: consciousness of oneself and consciousness of one’s experience. While “self-consciousness” is (...) often taken to refer to the former notion, the most common variant of the constitutive claim, on which I focus here, targets the latter. This claim can be further interpreted in two ways: on a deflationary reading, it falls within the scope of foundational claims about consciousness, while on an inflationary reading, it points to determinate aspects of phenomenology that are not acknowledged by the foundational claims as being aspects of all conscious mental states. I argue that the deflationary reading of the constitutive claim is plausible, but should be formulated without using a term as polysemous and suggestive as “self-consciousness”; by contrast, the inflationary reading is not adequately supported, and ultimately rests on contentious intuitions about phenomenology. I conclude that we should abandon the idea that self-consciousness is constitutive of consciousness. (shrink)

How are we to connect the mechanist methodology used by Baglivi in his physiological treatises with the apparently strict empiricism that he promotes in his therapeutic work entitled Practice of Physick, reduc’d to the Ancient Way of Observations? In order to answer this question, we examine the methodological implications of the “history of diseases” that Baglivi promotes by using Bacon’s recommendations in the Novum organum. Then, we compare this result with the place that historians generally gave to Baglivi in the (...) medical context of that time: the place of a dogmatic and “iatromechanist” physician who was far from practical and therapeutic concerns. This confrontation allows us first to apprehend the polemical origin of the so-called “iatromechanism” as a historiographical label, and second, to question the preeminence of the role of observations in the shaping of the classical distinction between “rational” physicians and “empirical” ones. When Early Modern physicians use the dichotomy between “empirical” and “rationalist” in order to discredit what they perceive as oversimplification or dogmatism, there is most often a third group at stake: a group which is depicted as the providential and intelligent solution to sectarianism. For Baglivi, this third group would be an “Empirick rational sect.” The distinction between a medicina prima and a medicina secunda allows us to understand such an apparently paradoxical category. (shrink)

This article presents a transit from the establishment of the non-adequacy of theoretical knowledge in Levinas’ philosophy towards Derrida’s proposal, according to which the relation with alterity is animal and not human. It also analyses the way in which the theoretical attitude brings a primacy of the subject and a “reduction of the other to sameness”, and also how the deconstruction of subjectivity enables a non-theoretical relationship with alterity. From this, it considers that alterity, described by Levinas as “human”, appears (...) to consciousness as fundamentally sensible. Finally, it discusses Derrida’s critique to Levinas, concerning a possible exclusion inherent to the concept of the “human”, and suggests considering animality as a common substrate to all alterity, proposal that goes beyond Levinas’ humanism. (shrink)

Mill's Utilitarianism is widely used to introduce elementary students to Moral Philosophy. One reason for this, I trust, is a recognition that Mill's doctrines and interests have an immediate attraction for most people. But certainly another reason is the belief that Mill's arguments contain a number of obvious fallacies, which an elementary student can be led to detect, thereby learning to practise critical philosophy.

Since the 1980s, there have been many attempts to bring together Critical Theory of Frankfurtian strain and French theories generally referred to as poststructuralist. The present text seeks to readdress the problem of their tricky articulation by taking a look at some vicissitudes those two currents of thought underwent in Brazil. In addition to the risk – embedded in the Parisian passion for dissolution – of positivizing atrocious aspects of Brazilian society related to the country’s multi-secular informality and backwardness, what (...) is at stake is the adequate understanding of the meaning and relevance of dialectical criticism in a peripheral country, in other words, the capacity to weigh the influx and gravitation of foreign ideas and forms in a society of inorganic culture, the possibility, finally, of critically verifying the supposed universality of hegemonic theories and categories in light of a cultural experience amassed under a heterodox modernization. (shrink)

In this article we distinguish four kinds of finalities at stake in Nieuwentijt’s “scopologia” (general design, teleology of health, particular final causes and organic uses). We show that the tension between the principle of economy and the assignation of particular final causes in Nieuwentijt’s physico-theology perfectly illustrates what later commentators as Gould and Lewontin called the problem of ‘panglossism’ in biology. It was a problem to which Leibniz himself drew attention in different texts.

Many see the mithnagdim as total rationalists. Therefore it has been assumed that R. Hayyim of Volozhin’s approach to Torah study was the same. Although rationalism may be a correct characterization of the method he used in talmudic study, it does not capture how R. Hayyim understood the essence of Torah study. Some have described Nefesh ha-Hayyim as demystifying Kabbalah. I agree that R. Hayyim opposes ecstatic Kabbalah. However, already in 1972 Norman Lamm noticed that R. Hayyim saw Torah study (...) as a form of clinging to God. In my article, I go further and demonstrate how torah lishmah for R. Hayyim is a radical idea that includes a legitimate path to unio mystica, and even a way to divine inspiration. (shrink)

Nicolas Steno’s criticism of L’Homme played a major role in the early reception of Cartesianism: from the late 1660s, the Discourse on the Anatomy of the Brain has never ceased being used in order to discredit Descartes’s philosophy. And yet, the anatomical works of Nicolas Steno are themselves informed by Cartesian method. This paradox has led to the depiction of Steno either as a repentant Cartesian or a non-Cartesian mechanist. In this paper, I clarify such problematic labels by studying the (...) different kinds of relationships between anthropology and anatomy that L’Homme may have used to justify. In particular, I show how Descartes’ clock analogy was used to defend two different conceptions of the articulation between anatomical observations and functional hypotheses respectively in La Forge and in Steno. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Plato's Doctrine of the Psyche as a Self-Moving Motion RAPHAEL DEMOS I WILLXSXTHEREADERto ignore for the time being what he has gleaned about the soul from the reading of the Phaedo and the Republic. In these dialogues Plato speaks of the soul sometimes as wholly rational, as having three parts, and so forth. But in these dialogues he is t~lklng of the human soul, which is a special (...) case, whereas in this essay I am de~Hng with the wider role and the concept of the soul as the efficient cause of motion, change, and all becoming everywhere in the cosmos. My cardinal texts in this exposition are the Sophist (246a-249d), the Phaedrus (245c, d), and a considerable portion of Laws, X. Consider the Phaedo, a dialogue with at least four motifs: it is a dramatic evocation of the last day in the life of Socrates, it is an argument for the immortality of the soul and for the reality of the world of ideas, it is a myth of the nether world, and finally, it is a theory of the cosmos as ruled by purpose--all in all, one of the great pieces of literature of the Western world. For the reader, it is an evocation of an attitude to life, based on Plato's conception of the soul--an attitude expressed in the famous phrase that the wise man spends his life meditating on death. As contrasted with what may be called his existential concern with the soul, in the other dialogues on which I will comment, Plato approaches the topic of the soul as part of his explanation of the cosmos. In these his attitude is objective and quasi-scientific. It is to this side of Plato's thought that I wish to call attention in this essay, where the establishment of the immortality of the soul is incidental to the more basic doctrine that the soul is an arche, a primary factor and an ontological principle. In the,Sophist, we find Plato playing the music of his philosophy in a new key. He refers to the "friends of the forms" as though he, himself, were an outsider looking in; then, too, he asserts that motion is really real in contrast to his derogatory references to motion in the Cratylus, the Phaedo, and the Republic.I In these (and other) dialogues, Plato contrasts change and changing things with the timeless forms in respect of reality: the former are said, at best, to be semi-real; only the latter are really real. But in the Sophist he changes his tune, arguing that total reality (~o ~v, to' ~a~rE~ By) includes both motion and rest (248e 8; 249d 3-4). What does he mean by these two words? That by 'rest' he means the realm of ideas is indicated (if not proved) by his references to the forms in the same context (247b 1But in the Theaeteius,he classifiesmotions in a semi-scientific fashion, leaving the impression on the reader that he regards motion as a reality. [133] 134 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 1-2; 249b, 10, c 1).2 As for motion, Plato makes it clear that the term covers not only (a) physical motion but also (b) life, (c) psyche, and (d) phronesis or naus (249b 5). All these are said to be forms of kinesis; how this is so--how life, soul, mason may be described as motions or changes--is a matter for later comment. What is more to the point is Plato's insistence that motion and what is moved are onta (beings, 249b 2, d 3). Plato uses change (metabol$) interchangeably with kinesis; anticipating the Phaedrus, I will include activity under change. And anticipating the Laws, I will characterize some of this activity as mental; indeed the Sophist, includes within change nous, phronesis, and episteme; that is to say, understanding (in the sense of an activity, 249a, b, c).s Plato offers various reasons in support of his contention that change is real. He may also be offering a special demonstration as follows. The philosopher who denies that change is real is engaged in a mental activity, in short... (shrink)

The Controversy over the Existence of the World (henceforth Controversy) is the magnum opus of Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden. Despite the renewed interest for Ingarden’s pioneering ontological work whithin analytic philosophy, little attention has been dedicated to Controversy's main goal, clearly indicated by the very title of the book: finding a solution to the centuries-old philosophical controversy about the ontological status of the external world. -/- There are at least three reasons for this relative indifference. First, even at the time (...) when the book was published, the Controversy was no longer seen as a serious polemical topic, whether it was disqualified as an archaic metaphysical pseudo-problem, or taken to be the last remnant of an antiscientific approach to philosophy culminating in idealism and relativism. Second, Ingarden’s reasoning on the matter is highly complex, at times misleading, and even occasionally faulty. Finally, his analysis is not only incomplete – Controversy being unachieved – but also arguably aporetic. -/- One may wonder, then, why it is still worth excavating this mammoth treatise to study an issue apparently no longer relevant to contemporary philosophy. Aside from historical and exegetical purposes, which are of course very interesting in their own right, Ingarden’s treatment of the Controversy remains one of the most detailed and ambitious ontological undertakings of the twentieth century. Not only does it lay out an incredibly detailed map of possible solutions to the Controversy, but it also tries to show why the latter is a genuine and fundamental problem that owes its hasty disqualification to various oversimplifications over the course of the history of philosophy. -/- In this chapter, I first give an overview of Ingarden’s method, which relies mainly on a combinatorial analysis. Then, I summarize his examination of possible solutions to the Controversy, and determine which ones can be ruled out on ontological grounds. Finally, I explain why this ambitious project ultimately leads to a theoretical impasse, leaving Ingarden unable to come up with a definitive solution to the Controversy – regardless of the fact that the book is unachieved. I argue that his analysis of the problem yields a more modest but nonetheless valuable result. (shrink)

Cet article propose de retracer dans l’œuvre de Foucault la présence d’un engagement critique discret mais continu avec la catégorie aristotélicienne de la phronesis. Au cours des années 1970, Foucault consacre ses recherches à de nombreuses instances de la techné, savoir pratique proche mais distinct de la phronesis. S’il ne mentionne pratiquement pas cette dernière, nous montrerons cependant que ce non-dit est tout sauf un impensé. C’est par un travail de et sur la phronesis que Foucault pensera la complexité des (...) savoirs pratiques et négociera la distinction entre sa propre méthode, dite « généalogique », et les méthodes qu’il prend pour objet. Nous verrons que cette distinction s’articule autour d’un second doublet, celui du cas et de la singularité – une distinction qui prend tout son sens lorsqu’elle est passée au crible de la triade aristotélicienne du savoir : épistémè, techné et phronesis. Nous verrons que la notion foucaldienne de singularité, loin d’être identique au cas particulier, en constitue plutôt le principe de différence interne. En substituant une herméneutique de la singularité à une herméneutique du particulier, Foucault s’autorise à penser une phronesis renouvelée pour les temps présents. (shrink)

Even though anthropogenic climate change is largely caused by industrialized nations, its burden is distributed unevenly with poor developing countries suffering the most. A common response to livelihood insecurities and destruction is migration. Using Peter Singer's ‘historical principle’, this paper argues that a morally just evaluation requires taking causality between climate change and migration under consideration. The historical principle is employed to emphasize shortcomings in commonly made philosophical arguments to oppose immigration. The article concludes that none of these arguments is (...) able to override the moral responsibility of industrialized countries to compensate for harms that their actions have caused. (shrink)

There has been much written of late on the topic of panentheism. Dissatisfied with many contemporary descriptions of “panentheism” and the related “pantheism,” which we feel arise out of theistic presuppositions, we produce our own definition of sorts, rooted in and paying respect to the term’s etymology and the concept’s roots in Indian religion and western philosophy. Furthermore, we consider and comment on the arguments and comments concerning panentheism’s definition and plausibility put forth by Göcke, Mullins, and Nickel.

In his philosophical writings, Leibniz regularly quotes Steno, Malpighi, Swammerdam and Leeuwenhoek not only to defend the preformationistic hypothesis, but also to praise their scientific methods as exemplary: he emphasizes the accuracy of their observations, the usefulness of their analogies or their skill at finding some 'series' in natural transformations. We will first analyse some epistemological features of the scientific writings of these four naturalists, which both delineate their 'mechanism' and meet several Leibnizian postulates, namely transspecific analogy grounded on the (...) uniformity of nature, anatomical resolution requiring a microscope to find the connection between phenomena, and finally the economy of postulates. Then, we will question the scientific implications of theoretical choices which are common to Leibniz's Protogaea and Steno's, Malpighi's and Swammerdam's writings about natural transformations. With this scientific background we can see how some mechanical assumptions shed light on Leibnizian conception of the continuity of thoughts. (shrink)

In his Elementorum Myologiae Specimen, Steno geometrizes "the new fabric of muscles" and their movement of contraction, so as to refute the main contemporary hypothesis about the functioning of the muscles. This physiological refutation relies on an abstract representation of the muscular fibre as a parallelepiped of flesh transversally linked to the tendons. Those two features have been comprehensively studied. But the method used by Steno, as well as the way he has chosen to present his physiological results, have so (...) far been neglected. Yet, Steno's work follows a true synthetic order, which he conceives as a tool to separate uncertain anatomical "elements" from the certain ones. We will show that the true understanding of this "more geometrico" order is the only way to avoid frequent misconceptions of the scientific aim pursued by Steno, which is neither to give a mathematical explanation of the functioning of the muscles, nor to reduce the muscles to some mathematical shapes. (shrink)

In his Elementorum Myologiae Specimen, Steno geometrizes “the new fabric of muscles” and their movement of contraction, so as to refute the main contemporary hypothesis about the functioning of the muscles. This physiological refutation relies on an abstract representation of the muscular fibre as a parallelepiped of flesh transversally linked to the tendons. Those two features have been comprehensively studied. But the method used by Steno, as well as the way he has chosen to present his physiological results, have so (...) far been neglected. Yet, Steno’s work follows a true synthetic order, which he conceives as a tool to separate uncertain anatomical “elements” from the certain ones. We will show that the true understanding of this “more geometrico” order is the only way to avoid frequent misconceptions of the scientific aim pursued by Steno, which is neither to give a mathematical explanation of the functioning of the muscles, nor to reduce the muscles to some mathematical shapes. (shrink)

In this article I propose to examine Bishop Butler's view of the nature of moral judgment, the epistemological problem which so greatly exercised some of the British moralists of his age. I have discussed the views of four of them in The Moral Sense. The problem seems to have been peculiarly lacking in interest for Butler. This may seem at first sight an odd statement: the moral faculty, or conscience, it would be said, is the chief subject of Butler's moral (...) writings. This is true enough. But although Butler's description of the working of conscience is unsurpassed, he gives no clear definition of the faculty. That is, he does not clearly consider the question whether the moral faculty can be said to be identical with some faculty usually called by another name, or whether it is sui generis. (shrink)

This monograph offers a critique of arguments for the existence of a specifically Christian God advanced by prominent scholar William Lane Craig. The discussion incorporates philosophical, mathematical, scientific, historical, and sociological approaches. The author does not seek to criticize religion in general, or Christianity specifically. Rather, he examines the modern and relatively sophisticated evidential case for Christian theism. Scholars have been arguing for theism or naturalism for centuries, and there seems little to add to the discussion, especially from the theistic (...) side. However, to assume that either theism or naturalism obtains is a false dichotomy. There are alternatives to both that merit consideration. Employing a probabilistic approach, the author advances this discussion. His work uniquely utilizes not only naturalistic hypotheses to argue against theism. It also presents supernaturalistic hypotheses. This leaves no question that theism is almost certainly false, even if some form of divine reality exists. This project seeks not to argue that Christianity or any other faith or religion is undesirable, but only to critically examine evidentialist claims posited by Christianity’s learned apologists. In fact, a major secondary aim is to consider alternative god-conceptions, such as polytheism and pantheism. This work aims to highlight that Christian theism is often granted special privileges by theistic philosophers of religion, which seems doubly inappropriate when certain alternative god-conceptions may even prove to be more plausible. (shrink)

Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical. But what does it mean to say that everything is physical? Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that no account of the physical is available which allows for a formulation of physicalism that is both possibly true and deserving of the name. As against this claim, I argue that a version of the via negativa—roughly, the view that the physical is to be characterised in terms of the nonmental—provides just such an account.

To what extent is possession of truth considered a good thing in the Republic? Certain passages of the dialogue appear to regard truth as a universal good, but others are more circumspect about its value, recommending that truth be withheld on occasion and falsehood disseminated. I seek to resolve this tension by distinguishing two kinds of truths, which I label 'philosophical' and 'non-philosophical'. Philosophical truths, I argue, are considered unqualifiedly good to possess, whereas non-philosophical truths are regarded as worth possessing (...) only to the extent that possession conduces to good behaviour in those who possess them. In the non-philosophical arena it is an open question, to be determined on a case-by-case basis, whether falsehood is more efficacious in furthering this practical aim than truth. (shrink)

Bayne and Carter argue that the mode of consciousness induced by psychedelic drugs does not fit squarely within the traditional account of modes as levels of consciousness, and favor instead a multi-dimensional account according to which modes of consciousness differ along several dimensions—none of which warrants a linear ordering of modes. We discuss the assumption that psychedelic drugs induce a single or paradigmatic mode of consciousness, as well as conceptual issues related to Bayne and Carter’s main argument against the traditional (...) account. Finally, we raise a set of questions about the individuation of dimensions selected to differentiate modes of consciousness that could be addressed in future discussions of the multi-dimensional account. (shrink)

The importance of teleology in the 18 th century has mainly been studied from the point of view of a few specific authors. Leibniz is one of the most convinced advocates of the use of final causes in both physics and metaphysics. Despite its significance for the history of teleology, very few studies were in fact devoted to the influence of the Leibnizian doctrine during the 18 th century. However, Leibniz’s reception allows us not only to understand his own views (...) on teleology in comparison with those that 18 th century thinkers attributed to him, but also to feed the conceptual debate on the legitimate articulation of finality and efficiency in natural philosophy in that period. Consequently, studies on 18 th century physico-theology may help us to clarify the following questions: what is the difference between explanations concerning organic functions and in the architectonic use of the principle of optimum in physics? And how exactly do “the details of physics” illustrate the general harmony of the world? In order to clarify these kinds of questions, the present issue explores how Leibniz’s 18 th century readers integrated in their own philosophical doctrines multiple interpretative possibilities opened up by Leibniz’s texts. (shrink)

In his Elementorum Myologiae Specimen, Steno geometrizes “the new fabric of muscles” and their movement of contraction, so as to refute the main contemporary hypothesis about the functioning of the muscles. This physiological refutation relies on an abstract representation of the muscular fibre as a parallelepiped of flesh transversally linked to the tendons. Those two features have been comprehensively studied. But the method used by Steno, as well as the way he has chosen to present his physiological results, have so (...) far been neglected. Yet, Steno’s work follows a true synthetic order, which he conceives as a tool to separate uncertain anatomical “elements” from the certain ones. We will show that the true understanding of this “more geometrico” order is the only way to avoid frequent misconceptions of the scientific aim pursued by Steno, which is neither to give a mathematical explanation of the functioning of the muscles, nor to reduce the muscles to some mathematical shapes. (shrink)

This article is about the exchanges between Leibniz, Arnauld, Bayle and Lamy on the subject of pain. The inability of Leibniz’s system to account for the phenomenon of pain is a recurring objection of Leibniz’s seventeenth-century Cartesian readers to his hypothesis of pre-established harmony: according to them, the spontaneity of the soul and its representative nature cannot account for the affective component of pain. Strikingly enough, this problem has almost never been addressed in Leibniz studies, or only incidentally, through the (...) more general problem of evil. My purpose in this article is to clarify Leibniz’s psychophysical parallelism by opposing his representationist account of pain to the functionalist account endorsed by Arnauld, Bayle, Lamy and Malebranche. (shrink)

This paper is based on the "cratylus", although there is occasional reference to other dialogues. In plato's contrast between the language of the gods and the language of mortals, we may discern something like the contrast between ideal and ordinary language. By names he means terms which have both reference and sense necessarily; such terms are also verbs, for verbs are names of actions and actions are realities; for instance, a blow. The criterion for the identity of names is that (...) they mean the same thing. "statements".unlike names, statements have meaning without necessarily having any reference. A word is a name "only" if what it names exits, whereas a statement may be false. A statement achieves meaning by purely internal criteria as to its composition. "the structure of statements". A statement is not a list of names; it is a unity and has meaning only in its character as a unity. Ryle's view that the terms in a sentence are not independent constituents and that their meaning is contextual is presented. The author concludes that plato is undecided on this matter. (shrink)